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Abstract
One-counter nets (OCN) are Petri nets with exactly one unbounded place. They are
equivalent to a subclass of one-counter automata with just a weak test for zero. Unlike
many other semantic equivalences, strong and weak simulation preorder are decidable for
OCN, but the computational complexity was an open problem. We show that both strong
and weak simulation preorder on OCN are PSPACE-complete.
1 Introduction
The model. One-counter automata (OCA) are Minsky counter automata with only one counter,
and they can also be seen as a subclass of pushdown automata with just one stack symbol (plus
a bottom symbol). One-counter nets (OCN) are Petri nets with exactly one unbounded place,
and they correspond to a subclass of OCA where the counter cannot be fully tested for zero,
because transitions enabled at counter value zero are also enabled at nonzero values. OCN are
arguably the simplest model of discrete infinite-state systems, except for those that do not have
a global finite control.
Previous results on semantic equivalence checking. Notions of behavioral semantic
equivalences have been classified in Van Glabbeek’s linear time - branching time spectrum [3].
The most common ones are, in order from finer to coarser, bisimulation, simulation and trace
equivalence. Each of these have their standard (called strong) variant, and a weak variant that
abstracts from arbitrarily long sequences of internal actions.
For OCA/OCN, strong bisimulation is PSPACE-complete [2], while weak bisimulation is
undecidable [9]. Strong trace inclusion is undecidable for OCA [11], and even for OCN [4], and
this trivially carries over to weak trace inclusion.
The picture is more complicated for simulation preorders. While strong and weak simulation
are undecidable for OCA [7], they are decidable for OCN. Decidability of strong simulation on
OCN was first proven in [1], by establishing that the simulation relation follows a certain regular
pattern. This idea was made more graphically explicit in later proofs [6, 5], which established
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the so-called Belt Theorem, that states that the simulation preorder relation on OCN can be
described by finitely many partitionings of the grid N × N, each induced by two parallel lines.
In particular, this implies that the simulation relation is semilinear. However, the proofs in
[1, 6, 5] did not yield any upper complexity bounds, since the first was based on two semi-
decision procedures and the later proof of the Belt Theorem was non-constructive. A PSPACE
lower bound for strong simulation on OCN follows from [10].
Decidability of weak simulation on OCN was shown in [4], using a converging series of
semilinear approximants. This proof used the decidability of strong simulation on OCN as an
oracle, and thus did not immediately yield any upper complexity bound.
Our contribution. We provide a new constructive proof of the Belt Theorem and derive
a PSPACE algorithm for checking strong simulation preorder on OCN. Together with the lower
bound from [10], this shows PSPACE-completeness of the problem.
Via a technical adaption of the algorithm for weak simulation in [4], and the new PSPACE al-
gorithm for strong simulation, we also obtain a PSPACE algorithm for weak simulation preorder
on OCN. Thus even weak simulation preorder on OCN is PSPACE-complete.
simulation bisimulation weak sim. weak bis. trace inclusion
OCN PSPACE PSPACE [2] PSPACE undecidable [9] undecidable [11]
OCA undecidable [7] PSPACE [2] undecidable [7] undecidable [9] undecidable [4]
2 Problem Statement
A labelled transition system (LTS) over a finite alphabet A of actions consists of a set of con-
figurations and, for every action a ∈ A, a binary relation a−→ between configurations.
Given two LTS S and S′, a relation R between the configurations of S and S′ is a simulation
if for every pair of configurations (c, c′) ∈ R and every step c a−→d there exists a step c′ a−→d′
such that (d, d′) ∈ R. Simulations are closed under union, so there exists a unique maximal
simulation. If S = S′ then this maximal simulation is a preorder, called simulation preorder,
and denoted by 4. If c 4 c′ then one says that c′ simulates c.
Simulation preorder can also be characterized by a Simulation Game as follows. The positions
are all pairs (c, c′) of configurations of S and S′ respectively. The game is played by two players
called Spoiler and Duplicator and proceeds in rounds. In every round, starting in a position
(c, c′), Spoiler chooses some a ∈ A and some configuration d with c a−→d. Then Duplicator
responds by choosing a configuration d′ with c′ a−→d′, and the next round continues from position
(d, d′). If one of the players cannot move then the other player wins, and Duplicator wins every
infinite play. It is well known that the Simulation Game is determined: for every initial position
(c, c′), exactly one of players has a winning strategy. Configuration c′ simulates c iff Duplicator
has a strategy to win the Simulation Game from position (c, c′).
Definition 1 (One-Counter Nets). A one-counter net (OCN) is a triple N = (Q,A, δ) given
by finite sets of control-states Q, action labels A and transitions δ ⊆ Q×A× {−1, 0, 1} ×Q. It
induces an infinite-state labelled transition system over the state set Q×N, whose elements will
be written as pm, where pm a−→qn iff (p, a, d, q) ∈ δ and n = m+ d ≥ 0.
We study the computational complexity of the following decision problem.
Simulation Checking for OCN
Input: Two OCN N and N ′ together with configurations qn and q′n′
of N and N ′ respectively, where n and n′ are given in binary.
Question: qn 4 q′n′ ?
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Theorem 2. The Simulation Checking Problem for OCN is in PSPACE.
Combined with the PSPACE-hardness result of [10], this yields PSPACE-completeness of
the problem.
Remark 3. Our construction can also be used to compute the simulation relation as a semilinear
set, but its description requires exponential space. However, checking a point instance qn 4 q′n′
of the simulation problem can be done in polynomial space by stepwise guessing and verifying
only a polynomialy bounded part of the relation; cf. Section 5.
Without restriction (see [1] for a justification) we assume that both OCN are normalised :
1. In Spoiler’s net N , every control-state has some outgoing transition with a non-negative
change of counter value.
2. Duplicator’s net N ′ is complete, i.e., every control-state has an outgoing transition for
every action (though the change in counter value may be negative).
Thus Spoiler cannot get stuck and only loses the game if it is infinite. Moreover, Duplicator can
only be stuck (and lose the game) when his counter equals zero.
Outline of the proof. One easily observes that the Simulation Game is monotone for
both players. If Duplicator wins the Simulation Game from a position (qn, q′n′) then he also
wins from (qn, q′m) for m > n′. Similarly, if Spoiler wins from (qn, q′n′) then she also wins
from (qm, q′n′) for m > n. For a fixed pair (q, q′) of control-states, both players winning regions
therefore split the grid N × N into two connected subsets. It is known [6, 5] that the frontier
between these subsets is contained in a belt, i.e., it lays between two parallel lines with rational
slope.
For the proof of our main result we analyse a symbolic Slope Game. This new game is similar
to the Simulation Game but necessarily ends after a small number of rounds. We show that
given sufficiently high excess of counter-values, both players can re-use winning strategies for the
Slope Game also in the Simulation Game. As a by-product of this characterization, we obtain
polynomial bounds on widths and slopes of the belts. Once the belt-coefficients are known,
one can compute the frontiers exactly because every frontier necessarily adheres to a regular
pattern.
3 Polynomially Bounded Belts
Let us fix two OCN N and N ′, with sets of control-states Q and Q′, respectively. Following
[5], we interpret 4 as 2-colouring of K = |Q × Q′| Euclidean planes, one for each pair of
control-states (q, q′) ∈ Q×Q′.
The main combinatorial insight of [5] (this was also present in [1], albeit less explicitly) is
the so-called Belt Theorem, that states that each such plane can be cut into segments by two
parallel lines such that the colouring of 4 in the outer two segments is constant; see Figure 1.
We provide a new constructive proof of this theorem, stated as Theorem 5 below, that allows
us to derive polynomial bounds on the coefficients of all belts.
Definition 4 (Positive vectors, direction, c-above, c-below). A vector (ρ, ρ′) ∈ Z×Z of integers
is called positive if (ρ, ρ′) ∈ N× N and (ρ, ρ′) 6= (0, 0). Its direction is the half-line R+ · (ρ, ρ′).
For a positive vector (ρ, ρ′) and a number c ∈ N we say that the point (n, n′) ∈ Z×Z is c-above
(ρ, ρ′) iff there exists some point (r, r′) ∈ R+ · (ρ, ρ′) in the direction of (ρ, ρ′) such that
n < r − c and n′ > r′ + c. (1)
3
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Figure 1: A belt with slope ρρ′ . The dashed half-line is the direction of (ρ, ρ
′).
Symmetrically, (n, n′) is c-below (ρ, ρ′) if is a point (r, r′) ∈ R+ · (ρ, ρ′) with
n > r + c and n′ < r′ − c. (2)
Theorem 5 (Belt Theorem). For every two one-counter nets N and N ′ with sets of control-
states Q and Q′ respectively, there is a bound c ∈ N such that for every pair (q, q′) ∈ Q×Q′ of
control-states there is a positive vector (ρ, ρ′) such that
1. if (n, n′) is c-above (ρ, ρ′) then qn 4 q′n′, and
2. if (n, n′) is c-below (ρ, ρ′) then qn 64 q′n′.
Moreover, c and all ρ, ρ′ are bounded polynomially w.r.t. the sizes of N and N ′.
4 Proof of the Belt Theorem
We consider OCN N and N ′ with sets of control-states Q and Q′, resp., and define the constant
K = |Q × Q′|. Abdulla and Cerans [1] showed that, above a certain level, the simulation
relation has a regular structure. An important parameter for this structure is the ratio n/n′
of the respective counter values n in Spoiler’s configuration qn of N and n′ in Duplicator’s
configuration q′n′ of N ′.
We further develop this intuition by defining a new finitary game (called the Slope Game; cf.
Section 4.1) that is played directly on the control graphs of the nets, and in which the objective of
the players is to minimize (resp. maximize) the ratio of the effects of recently observed minimal
cycles. Then we show how to transform winning strategies in the Slope Game into winning
strategies in the original simulation game. First we need to define some properties of vectors.
Definition 6 (Behind, Steeper). Let (ρ, ρ′) be a positive and (α, α′) ∈ Z2 an arbitrary vector.
We place the two on the plane with a common starting point and consider the clockwise oriented
angle from (ρ, ρ′) to (α, α′). We say that (α, α′) is behind (ρ, ρ′) if the oriented angle is strictly
between 0◦ and 180◦. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
Positive vectors may be naturally ordered: We will call (ρ, ρ′) steeper than (α, α′), written
(α, α′) ≺ (ρ, ρ′), if (α, α′) is behind (ρ, ρ′).
Note that the property of one vector being behind another only depends on their directions.
The following simple lemma will be useful in the sequel.
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Lemma 7. Let (ρ, ρ′) be a positive vector and c, n, n′ ∈ N.
1. If (n, n′) is c-below (ρ, ρ′) then (n, n′)+(α, α′) is c-below (ρ, ρ′) for any vector (α, α′) which
is behind (ρ, ρ′).
2. If (n, n′) is c-above (ρ, ρ′) then (n, n′)+(α, α′) is c-above (ρ, ρ′) for any vector (α, α′) which
is not behind (ρ, ρ′).
(ρ, ρ′)
(α, α′)
(β, β′)
(δ, δ′)
Figure 2: Vectors (α, α′) and (β, β′) are be-
hind (ρ, ρ′), but (δ, δ′) is not. Also, (α, α′) ≺
(ρ, ρ′).
Duplicator
wins Game
continues
Spoiler wins
(ρ, ρ′)
Figure 3: Evaluating the winning condition
in position (pi, (ρ, ρ′)) after a phase of the
Slope Game.
4.1 Slope Game
Definition 8 (Product Control Graph, Lasso, Effect of a path). Given two OCN N = (Q,A, δ)
and N ′ = (Q′, A, δ′), their product control graph is the finite, edge-labelled graph with nodes
Q×Q′ and (A× N× N)-labelled edges E given by
(p, p′) a,d,d
′
−→ (q, q′) ∈ E iff p a,d−→q ∈ δ and p′ a,d
′
−→q′ ∈ δ′. (3)
A path
pi = (q0, q
′
0)
a0,d0,d′0−→ (q1, q′1)
a1,d1,d′1−→ . . . ak−1,dk−1,d
′
k−1−→ (qk, q′k) (4)
from (q0, q′0) to (qk, q′k) in this graph is called lasso if it contains a cycle while none of its strict
prefixes does. That is, if there exist i < k such that (qk, q′k) = (qi, q
′
i) and for all 0 ≤ i < j < k,
(qi, q
′
i) 6= (qj , q′j). The lasso pi splits into prefix(pi) = (q0, q′0)
a0,d0,d′0−→ . . . ai−1,di−1,d
′
i−1−→ (qi, q′i) and
cycle(pi) = (qi, q′i)
ai,di,d
′
i−→ . . . ak−1,dk−1,d
′
k−1−→ (qk, q′k). The effect of a path is the cumulative sum of
the effects of its transitions:
∆(pi) =
k−1∑
i=0
(di, d
′
i) ∈ Z× Z. (5)
The effects of cycles will play a central role in our further construction. The intuition is that
if a play of a Simulation Game describes a lasso then the players “agree” on the chosen cycle.
Repeating this cycle will change the ratio of the counter values towards its effect.
To formalize this intuition, we define a finitary Slope Game which proceeds in phases. In
each phase, the players alternatingly move on the control graphs of their original nets, ignoring
the counter, and thereby determine the next lasso that occurs. After such a phase, a winning
condition is evaluated that compares the effect of the chosen lasso’s cycle with that of previous
phases. Now either one player immediately wins or the next phase starts, but then the steepness
of the observed effect must have strictly decreased. The number of different effects of simple
cycles thus bounds the maximal length of a game.
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Definition 9 (Slope Game). A Slope Game is a strictly alternating two player game played
on a pair N ,N ′ of one-counter nets. The game positions are pairs (pi, (ρ, ρ′)), where pi is an
acyclic path in the product control graph of N and N ′, and (ρ, ρ′) is a positive vector which we
call slope.
The game is divided into phases, each starting with a path pi = (q0, q′0) of length 0. Until a
phase ends, the game proceeds in rounds like a Simulation Game, but the players pick transition
rules instead of transitions: in a position (pi, (ρ, ρ′)) where pi ends in states (q, q′), Spoiler chooses
a transition rule q a,d−→p, then Duplicator responds with a transition rule q′ a,d−→p′. If the extended
path pi′ = pi a,d,d
′
−→ (p, p′) is still not a lasso, the next round continues from the updated position
(pi′, (ρ, ρ′)); otherwise the phase ends with outcome (pi′, (ρ, ρ′)). The slope (ρ, ρ′) does not restrict
the possible moves of either player, nor changes during a phase. We thus speak of the slope of
a phase.
If a round ends in position (pi, (ρ, ρ′)) where pi is a lasso, then the winning condition is eval-
uated. We distinguish three non-intersecting cases depending on how the effect ∆(cycle(pi)) =
(α, α′) of the lasso’s cycle relates to (ρ, ρ′):
1. If (α, α′) is not behind (ρ, ρ′), Duplicator wins immediately.
2. If (α, α′) is behind (ρ, ρ′) but not positive, Spoiler wins immediately.
3. If (α, α′) is behind (ρ, ρ′) and positive, the game continues with a new phase from position
(pi′, (α, α′)), where pi′ is the path of length 0 consisting of the pair of ending states of pi.
Figure 3 illustrates the winning condition. Note that if there is no immediate winner it is
guaranteed that (α, α′) is a positive vector.
The fundamental intuition for the connection between the Slope Game and the Simulation
Game is as follows. The Slope Game from initial position ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)) determines how the
initial slope (ρ, ρ′) relates to the belt in the plane for (q, q′) in the simulation relation. Roughly
speaking, if (ρ, ρ′) is less steep than the belt then Spoiler wins; if (ρ, ρ′) is steeper then Duplicator
wins. Finally, when the initial slope (ρ, ρ′) is exactly as steep as the belt, any player may win
the Slope Game.
Consider a Simulation Game in which the ratio n/n′ of the counter values of Spoiler and
Duplicator is the same as the ratio ρ/ρ′, i.e. suppose (n, n′) is contained in the direction of
(ρ, ρ′). Suppose also that the values (n, n′) are sufficiently large. By monotonicity, we know
that the steeper the slope (ρ, ρ′), the better for Duplicator. Hence if the effect (α, α′) of some
cycle is behind (ρ, ρ′) and positive, then it is beneficial for Spoiler to repeat this cycle. With
more and more repetitions, the ratio of the counter values will get arbitrarily close to (α, α′).
On the other hand, if (α, α′) is behind (ρ, ρ′) but not positive then Spoiler wins by repeating
the cycle until the Duplicator’s counter decreases to 0. Finally, if the effect of the cycle is not
behind (ρ, ρ′) then repeating this cycle leads to Duplicator’s win.
The next lemma follows from the observation that in Slope Games, the slope of a phase must
be strictly less steep than those of all previous phases.
Lemma 10. For a fixed pair N ,N ′ of OCN,
1. any Slope Game ends after at most (K+ 1)2 phases, and
2. Slope Games are effectively solvable in PSPACE.
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Proof. After every phase, the slope (ρ, ρ′) is equal to the effect of a simple cycle, which must be a
positive vector. Thus the absolute values of both numbers ρ and ρ′ are bounded by K = |Q×Q′|.
It follows that the total number of different possible values for (ρ, ρ′), and therefore the maximal
number of phases played, is at most (K+ 1)2. This proves the first part of the claim. Point 2 is
a direct consequence as one can find and verify winning strategies by an exhaustive search.
Strategies in Slope Games. Consider one phase of a Slope Game, starting from a po-
sition (pi, (ρ, ρ′)). The phase ends with a lasso whose cycle effect (α, α′) satisfies exactly one of
three conditions, as examined by the evaluating function. Accordingly, depending on its initial
position, every phase falls into exactly one of three disjoint cases:
1. Spoiler has a strategy to win the Slope Game immediately,
2. Duplicator has a strategy to win the Slope Game immediately or
3. neither Spoiler nor Duplicator have a strategy to win immediately.
In case 1. or 2. we call the phase final, and in case 3. we call it non-final. The non-final phases are
the most interesting ones because in those, both players have a strategy that at least prevents
an immediate loss.
Strategy Trees. Both in final and non-final phases, a strategy for Spoiler or Duplicator
is a tree as described below. For the definition of strategy trees we need to consider, not only
Spoiler’s positions (pi, (ρ, ρ′)) but also Duplicator’s positions, the intermediate positions within
a single round. These intermediate positions may be modelled as triples (pi, (ρ, ρ′), t) where t is
a transition rule in N from the last state of pi. Observe that the bipartite directed graph, with
positions of a phase as vertices and edges determined by the single-move relation, is actually a
tree, call it T . Thus a Spoiler-strategy, i.e. a subgraph of T containing exactly one successor of
every Spoiler’s position and all successors of every Duplicator’s position, is a tree as well; and
so is any strategy for Duplicator.
Such a strategy (tree) in the Slope Game naturally splits into segments, each segment being
a strategy (tree) in one phase. The segments themselves are also arranged into a tree, which
we call segment tree. Irrespectively which player wins a Slope Game, according to the above
observations, this player’s winning strategy contains segments of two kinds:
• non-leaf segments are strategies to either win immediately or continue the Slope Game
(these are strategies for non-final phases);
• leaf segments are strategies to win the Slope Game immediately (these are strategies in
final phases).
By the segment depth of a strategy we mean the depth of its segment tree. By Lemma 10,
Point 1, we know that a Slope Game ends after at most dmax = (K+ 1)2 phases. Consequently,
the segment depths of strategies are at most dmax as well.
A value of c = K · dmax is sufficient for the claim of Theorem 5. The intuition behind this
value is that for a winning player in the Slope Game, an excess of K per phase is sufficient to
be able to safely “replay” a winning strategy in the Simulation Game. Formally, this is stated
by the following two crucial lemmas, proofs of which can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 11. Suppose Spoiler has a winning strategy of segment depth d in the Slope Game from
a position ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)). Then Spoiler wins the Simulation Game from every position (qn, q′n′)
which is (K · d)-below (ρ, ρ′).
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Lemma 12. Suppose Duplicator has a winning strategy of segment depth d in the Slope Game
from a position ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)). Then Duplicator wins the Simulation Game from every position
(qn, q′n′) which is (K · d)-above (ρ, ρ′).
4.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Let c = K · dmax. For any two states q ∈ Q and q′ ∈ Q′ of the nets N and N ′ we will determine
the ratio (ρ, ρ′) that, together with c, characterises the belt of the plane (q, q′). First observe
the following monotonicity property of the Slope Game.
Lemma 13. If Spoiler wins the Slope Game from a position ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)) and (σ, σ′) is less
steep than (ρ, ρ′) then Spoiler also wins the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (σ, σ′)).
Proof. Assume that Spoiler wins the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)) while Duplicator wins
from ((q, q′), (σ, σ′)), for some (σ, σ′) ≺ (ρ, ρ′). Observe that in both cases, winning strategies of
segment depth ≤ dmax exist. As (σ, σ′) is less steep than (ρ, ρ′), there is a point (n, n′) ∈ N×N
which is both c-above (σ, σ′) and c-below (ρ, ρ′). Applying both Lemma 11 and 12 immediately
yields a contradiction.
Equivalently, if Duplicator wins the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)) and (σ, σ′) is steeper
than (ρ, ρ′) then Duplicator also wins the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (σ, σ′)). We conclude that
for every pair (q, q′) of states, there is a boundary slope (β, β′) such that
1. Spoiler wins the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (σ, σ′)) for every (σ, σ′) less steep than (β, β′);
2. Duplicator wins the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (σ, σ′)) for every (σ, σ′) steeper than (β, β′).
Note that we claim nothing about the winner from the position ((q, q′), (β, β′)) itself. Ap-
plying Lemmas 11 and 12 we see that this boundary slope (β, β′) satisfies the claims 1 and 2 of
Theorem 5. Indeed, consider a pair (n, n′) ∈ N×N of counter values. If (n, n′) is c-below (β, β′),
then there is certainly a line (β¯, β¯′) less steep than (β, β′) such that (n, n′) is c-below (β¯, β¯′).
By point 1 above, Spoiler wins the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (β¯, β¯′)). By Lemma 11, Spoiler
wins the Simulation Game from (qn, q′n′). Analogously, one can use point 2 above together with
Lemma 12 to show Point 2 of Theorem 5.
It remains to show that the boundary slope (β, β′) is polynomial in the sizes of N and N ′.
We show that (β, β′) must in fact be the effect of a simple cycle. Because such cycles are no
longer than K = |Q × Q′| and because along a path of length K the counter values cannot
change by more than K, we conclude that −K ≤ β, β′ ≤ K.
Definition 14 (Equivalent vectors). Consider all the non-zero effects (α, α′) of all cycles to-
gether with their opposite vectors (−α,−α′) and denote the set of all these vectors by V . Call
two positive vectors (ρ, ρ′) and (σ, σ′) equivalent if for all (α, α′) ∈ V ,
(α, α′) is behind (ρ, ρ′) ⇐⇒ (α, α′) is behind (σ, σ′). (6)
In other words, equivalent vectors lie in the same angle determined by a pair of vectors from
V that are neighbours angle-wise. We claim that equivalent slopes have the same winner in the
Slope Game:
Lemma 15. If (ρ, ρ′) and (σ, σ′) are equivalent then the same player wins the Slope Game from
((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)) and ((q, q′), (σ, σ′)).
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Proof. A winning strategy in the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)) may be literally used in the
Slope Game from ((q, q′), (σ, σ′)). This holds because the assumption that (ρ, ρ′) and (σ, σ′) are
equivalent implies that all possible outcomes of the initial phase of the Slope Game are evaluated
equally.
Lemma 15 implies that the boundary slope is in V . This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.
4.3 A Sharper Estimation
Theorem 5 provides a polynomial bound on the constant c and the slopes of all belts, with
respect to the sizes of N and N ′. However, the proof of Theorem 5 reveals that a slightly
stronger result actually holds, which will be useful in proving the complexity bound for weak
simulation in Section 6. We can estimate a bound on c in terms of the following two parameters
of the product control graph N ×N ′:
• scc, the size of the largest strongly connected component, and
• acyc, the length of the longest acyclic path.
In particular, we claim that Theorem 5 still holds with the constant c bounded by
c ≤ poly(scc) + acyc. (7)
Intuitively, c is the excess of counter value needed to replay a Slope Game strategy in the
Simulation Game. This directly corresponds to the maximal number of alternations in a play
of the Slope Game. Every phase ends in a cycle, which must be contained in some strongly
connected component and is thus no longer than scc. So the segment depth of Slope Game
strategies is bounded by (scc+ 1)2.
We can decompose plays of the Slope Game by separating subpaths that contain at least
one cycle and stay in one strongly connected component, and the remaining subpaths. One can
now show that in fact, a counter value of scc suffices to enable subpaths of the first kind. The
segment depth bounds the number of such subpaths in any play. Secondly, by definition, the
subpaths of the second kind cannot share any points. The sum of their lengths is hence bounded
by acyc. We conclude that a value of c = (scc+ 1)2 · scc+ acyc is sufficient.
5 Strong Simulation is PSPACE-complete
Using our stronger version of the Belt Theorem from Section 4, we derive an algorithm for
checking simulation preorder, similarly as in [1, 6, 5].
As before we fix two OCN N and N ′, with sets of control-states Q and Q′, respectively. By
Lemma 10, Point 2, we can compute in PSPACE, for every pair (q, q′) ∈ Q × Q′, the positive
vector (ρ, ρ′) satisfying Theorem 5; we denote this vector by slope(q, q′). We define belt(q, q′)
to be the set of points (n, n′) ∈ N2 that are neither c-above nor c-below slope(q, q′). As all
vectors slope(q, q′) and the widths of all belts are polynomially bounded (by Theorem 5), we
observe that every two non-parallel belts are disjoint outside a polynomially bounded initial
rectangle, denoted L0, between corners (0, 0) and (l0, l′0) (see Figure 4).
Recall that the simulation preorder on the configurations with the pair of control-states (q, q′)
is trivial outside of belt(q, q′): it contains all pairs (qn, q′n′) s.t. (n, n′) is c-above slope(q, q′),
and contains no pairs (qn, q′n′) s.t. (n, n′) is c-below slope(q, q′). We show that inside a belt,
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Figure 4: The initial rectangle L0 (blue) and two belts. Outside L0, the colouring of a belt
consists of some exponentially bounded block (red), and another exponentially bounded non-
trivial block (green) which repeats ad infinitum along the rest of the belt.
the points corresponding to configurations in simulation are ultimately periodic in the sense
defined below.
By the definition of belts, (n, n′) ∈ belt(q, q′) ⇐⇒ (n, n′) + slope(q, q′) ∈ belt(q, q′),
i.e., translation via the vector slope(q, q′) preserves membership in belt(q, q′). This is why we
restrict our focus to multiples of vectors slope(q, q′). We write rect(q, q′, j) for the rectangle
between corners (0, 0) and (l0, l′0) + j · slope(q, q′).
Definition 16 (ultimately-periodic). For a fixed pair (q, q′) ∈ Q × Q′ and j, k ∈ N, a subset
R ⊆ belt(q, q′) is called (j, k)-ultimately-periodic if for all (n, n′) ∈ N2 \ rect(q, q′, j),
(n, n′) ∈ R ⇐⇒ (n, n′) + k · slope(q, q′) ∈ R. (8)
Remark 17. Observe that for fixed q and q′, every (j, k)-ultimately-periodic set R can be rep-
resented by the numbers j and k, and two sets
R ∩ rect(q, q′, j) and (R \ rect(q, q′, j)) ∩ rect(q, q′, j + k).
The following lemma states a property which is crucial for our algorithm. It is actually a
sharpening of the result of [5], with additional effective bounds on periods inside belts.
Lemma 18. For every pair (q, q′) ∈ Q×Q′, the set
4q,q′ = {(n, n′) ∈ belt(q, q′) : qn 4 q′n′}
is (j, k)-ultimately periodic for some j, k ∈ N exponentially bounded w.r.t. the sizes of N , N ′.
Thus, when searching for a simulation relation inside belts, we may safely restrict ourselves
to (j, k)-ultimately-periodic relations, for exponentially bounded j and k. According to the
remark above, every such simulation admits the EXPSPACE description that consists, for every
pair of states (q, q′), of:
• a polynomially bounded vector (ρ, ρ′) = slope(q, q′);
• a polynomially bounded relation init(q, q′) ⊆ L0 inside the initial rectangle L0;
• exponentially bounded natural numbers jq,q′ , kq,q′ ∈ N; and
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• two exponentially bounded relations:
aperiodic(q, q′) ⊆ belt(q, q′) ∩ rect(q, q′, jq,q′)
periodic(q, q′) ⊆ (belt(q, q′) \ rect(q, q′, jq,q′)) ∩ rect(q, q′, jq,q′ + kq,q′).
The above characterization leads to the following naive decision procedure, which works in
EXPSPACE: Guess the description of a candidate relation R for the simulation relation, verify
that it is a simulation and check if it contains the input pair of configurations.
Checking whether the input pair is in the (semilinear) relation R is trivial. To verify that
the relation R is a simulation, one needs to check the simulation condition for every pair of
configurations (qn, q′n′) in R, i.e., Duplicator can ensure that after playing one round of the
Simulation Game, the resulting pair of configurations is still in R.
The simulation condition is local in the sense that it refers only to positions with neighbouring
counter values (plus/minus 1). This, together with the fact that belts are disjoint outside L0,
implies that the complete one-neighbourhoods of points in the periodic part repeats along the
belt. It therefore suffices to examine those elements which are in the EXPSPACE description to
check if the simulation condition holds.
A PSPACE procedure. The naive algorithm outlined above may easily be turned into
a PSPACE algorithm by a standard shifting window trick. Instead of guessing the complete
exponential-size description upfront, we start by guessing the polynomially bounded relation
inside L0 and verifying it locally. Next, the procedure stepwise guesses parts of the relations
aperiodic(q, q′) and later periodic(q, q′), inside a polynomially bounded rectangle window
through the belt and shifts this window along the belt, checking the simulation condition for
all contained points on the way. Since the simulation condition is local, everything outside this
window may be forgotten, save for the first repetitive window that is used as a certificate for
successfully having guessed a consistent periodic set, once it repeats. Because this repetition
needs to occur after an exponentially bounded number of shifts, polynomial space is sufficient to
store a binary counter that counts the number of shifts and allows to terminate unsuccessfully
once the limit is reached.
6 Application to Weak Simulation Checking
A natural extension of simulation is weak simulation, that abstracts from internal steps.
Definition 19. For a LTS over actions A ∪ {τ} define weak step relations by τ=⇒ = τ−→∗
and a=⇒ = τ−→∗ a−→ τ−→∗ for a 6= τ . Weak simulation (2 ) is now defined just like 4 , using
Simulation Games, in which Duplicator moves along weak steps.
For systems without τ -labelled transitions, a−→ = a=⇒ and therefore strong and weak sim-
ulation coincide. The PSPACE lower bound from [10] for checking strong simulation thus also
holds for weak simulation checking over OCN.
Weak simulation has recently been shown to be decidable for OCN [4]. The main obstacle
was that Duplicator’s system is infinitely branching w.r.t. the weak a=⇒ steps, which implies
that non-simulation does not necessarily manifest itself locally.
In [4], this problem is resolved by constructing a monotone decreasing sequence of semilinear
approximant relations that converges to weak simulation at a finite index. The approximant
relations are derived from a symbolic characterization of Duplicator’s infinitely-branching sys-
tem. They can be computed inductively by characterizing them in terms of strong simulation
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over suitably modified OCN. The fact that one can effectively compute semilinear descriptions
of 4 over OCN [5] allows to successively compute the approximant relations and to detect
convergence of the sequence.
Here we show that the polynomial bounds from Theorem 5, together with the technique from
[4], imply a PSPACE upper bound even for checking weak simulation on OCN. In particular,
we claim that the sizes of the “suitably modified OCN” mentioned above, which characterize the
approximants, are in fact polynomial for every index i ∈ N in the sequence. A more detailed
analysis can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 20. Checking weak simulation preorder on OCN is PSPACE-complete.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that both strong and weak simulation preorder checking between two given OCN
processes is PSPACE-complete. Moreover, it is possible to compute representations of the entire
simulation relations as semilinear sets, but these require exponential space. One cannot expect
polynomial-size representations of the relations as semilinear sets, because otherwise one could
first guess the representation and then verify in coNPNP (for strong simulation) that there are
no counterexamples to the local simulation condition. This would yield an algorithm in Σ3p in
the polynomial hierarchy, which (under standard assumptions in complexity theory) contradicts
the PSPACE-hardness of the problem.
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A Missing Proofs from Sections 4 and 5
A.1 Proof of Lemma 11
Suppose Spoiler wins the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)) using a strategy of segment depth d.
A position in the Slope Game contains a positive vector (ρ, ρ′), while a position in the Simulation
Game contains a pair (n, n′) ∈ N×N of counter values, that can also be interpreted as a positive
vector. We will derive a strategy for Spoiler in the Simulation Game that is winning from all
positions (qn, q′n′) where (n, n′) is (K·d)-below (ρ, ρ′). The crucial idea of the proof is to consider
the segments of the supposed winning strategy in the Slope Game separately. Each such segment
is a strategy for one phase and as such, describes how to move in the Simulation Game until the
next lasso is observed. Afterwards, Spoiler can chose to continue playing according to the next
lower segment, or “roll back” the cycle and continue playing according to the current segment.
By the rules of the Slope Game we observe that after sufficiently many such rollbacks the
difference between the ratio n/n′ of the actual counters and the slope of the next lower segment
is negligible, i.e., these vectors are equivalent in the sense of Definition 14 in Section 4.2. Then,
Spoiler can safely continue to play according to the next lower segment at level d− 1.
To safely play such a strategy in the Simulation Game, Spoiler needs to ensure that her
own counter does not decrease too much as that could restrict her ability to move. We observe
however, that any partial play that “stays in some segment” at height d, can be decomposed
into a single acyclic prefix plus a number of cycles. Such a play therefore preserves the invariant
that all visited points are K · (d−1)-below the slope of the phase. In particular, this means that
Spoiler’s counter is always ≥ K · (d− 1).
Formally, the proof of Lemma 11 proceeds by induction on the segment depth d.
Case d = 1. This means that Spoiler has a strategy to win the Slope Game in the first
phase, and hence to enforce that the effect of all cycles is behind (ρ, ρ′) but not positive. Denote
this strategy by T . In the Simulation Game, Spoiler will re-use this strategy as we describe below.
At every position (qn, q′n′) in the Simulation Game, Spoiler keeps a record of the corresponding
position (pi, (ρ, ρ′)) in the Slope Game, enforcing the invariant that (q, q′) are the ending states
of the path pi.
From the initial position (qn, q′n′) with corresponding position ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)), Spoiler starts
playing the Simulation Game according to T , until the path in the corresponding position of
the Slope Game, say pi1, describes a lasso (this must happen after at most K rounds). Thus pi1
splits into:
pi1 = pi1 p¯i1 (9)
where the suffix p¯i1 is a cycle. Denote by (α˜1, α˜′1) and (α¯1, α¯′1) the effects of pi1 and p¯i1, respec-
tively. The current values of counters are clearly
n+ α˜1 + α¯1 and n′ + α˜′1 + α¯
′
1 (10)
assuming that the play did not end by now with Spoiler’s win. As the length of path pi1 is at
most K and (n, n′) is assumed to be K-below (ρ, ρ′), we know that all positions visited by now
in the Simulation Game were below (ρ, ρ′). In particular, Spoiler’s counter value was surely
non-negative by now.
Now Spoiler rolls back the cycle p¯i1, namely changes the corresponding position in the Slope
Game from (pi1, (ρ, ρ′)) to (pi1, (ρ, ρ′)) and continues playing according to T . The play continues
until Spoiler wins or the path in the corresponding position of the Slope Game, say pi2, is a lasso
again. Again, we split the path into an acyclic prefix and a cycle:
pi2 = pi2 p¯i2. (11)
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Denote the respective effects by (α˜2, α˜′2) and (α¯2, α¯′2). A crucial but simple observation is that,
assuming that the play did not end by now with Spoiler’s win, the current values of counters
are now
n+ α˜2 + α¯1 + α¯2 and n′ + α˜′2 + α¯
′
1 + α¯
′
2, (12)
i.e. the effect (α˜1, α˜′1) of pi1 does not contribute any more. As (α¯1, α¯′1) is behind (ρ, ρ′) we may
apply Lemma 7 to (α¯1, α¯′1) and c = 0 in order to deduce, similarly as before, that all positions
by now were below (ρ, ρ′). Now Spoiler rolls back p¯i2 by establishing (pi2, (ρ, ρ′)) as the new
corresponding position in the Slope Game. Continuing in this way, after k rollbacks the counter
values are:
n + α˜k + (α¯1 + α¯2 + . . . + α¯k−1) + α¯k and
n′ + α˜′k + (α¯
′
1 + α¯
′
2 + . . .+ α¯
′
k−1) + α¯
′
k,
(13)
assuming that Spoiler did not win earlier. All the vectors (α¯i, α¯′i), and thus also the sum
(α¯1 + α¯2 + . . . + α¯k−1, α¯′1 + α¯
′
2 + . . .+ α¯
′
k−1) (14)
are behind (ρ, ρ′), hence similarly as before all positions by now have been below (ρ, ρ′), by
Lemma 7 applied to the vector (14) above.
This in particular means that Spoiler’s counter remains above value c. However, as by
assumption all observed cycles come from a final segment in her Slope Game strategy, the
vector (14) cannot be positive for any k. Thus, every rollback strictly decreases Duplicator’s
counter value. We conclude that after sufficiently many rollbacks, Duplicator’s counter must
eventually drop below 0 and hence Spoiler eventually wins.
Case d > 1. By assumption, Spoiler has a strategy T for the Slope Game, which has
segment depth d > 0. As before, Spoiler’s strategy in the Simulation Game will re-use the
strategy T from the Slope Game, using rollbacks.
Spoiler plays according to the initial segment of this strategy, that allows her to win or at
least guarantee that the effect of the first observed lasso’s circle is less steep than (ρ, ρ′). After
l rollbacks, the counter values will be of the form:
n+ α˜+ (α¯1 + . . . + α¯m) + (γ¯1 + . . . + γ¯l) and
n′ + α˜′ + (α¯′1 + . . .+ α¯
′
m) + (γ¯
′
1 + . . .+ γ¯
′
l),
(15)
where the absolute values of α˜ and α˜′ are at most K, the vectors (γ¯i, γ¯′i) are behind (ρ, ρ
′) and
positive, and the vectors (α¯i, α¯′i) are behind (ρ, ρ
′) and non-positive. We apply Lemma 7 to
c = K · (d− 1) and learn that all the positions by now have been (K · (d− 1))-below (ρ, ρ′).
In general Spoiler has no power to choose whether a effect of a cycle at a next rollback is
positive or not. However, if from some point on all effects are non-positive then Duplicator’s
counter eventually drops below 0 and Spoiler wins. Thus w.l.o.g,˙ we focus on positions in the
Simulation Game immediately after a rollback of a cycle with positive effect. Using the notation
from (15), suppose (γl, γ′l) is the effect of the last rolled back cycle. We need the following claim
in order to apply the induction assumption:
Claim 1. After sufficiently many rollbacks the vector (n¯, n¯′) of current counter values in the
Simulation Game is (K · (d − 1))-below some vector (γ, γ′) which is equivalent to the positive
effect (γl, γ′l) of the last rolled back cycle.
Proof. By an easy geometric argument. Ignore vectors (αi, α′i) as they preserve being (K·(d−1))-
below all positive vectors that are less steep than (ρ, ρ′). If Duplicator wants to falsify the
condition, he would need to increase the steepness of the rolled back cycle infinitely often, which
is clearly impossible as there are only finitely many simple cycles.
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Let (q¯n¯, q¯′n¯′) be a position of the Simulation Game satisfying the claim. We know that
Spoiler has a winning strategy in the Slope Game from ((q¯, q¯′), (γl, γ′l)), of segment depth at
most d− 1. Because (γl, γ′l) is equivalent to (γ, γ′), we can apply Lemma 15 and know that the
same strategy is winning in the Slope Game from ((q¯, q¯′), (γ, γ′)). By the induction assumption
we conclude that Spoiler wins the Simulation Game from (q¯n¯, q¯′n¯′), which completes the proof
of Lemma 11.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 12
Suppose Duplicator wins the Slope Game from ((q, q′), (ρ, ρ′)) using a strategy of segment depth
d. We will show that Duplicator wins the Simulation Game from every position (qn, q′n′) where
(n, n′) is (K · d)-above (ρ, ρ′). We will again build on the concept of rollbacks and proceed by
induction on d.
Case d = 1. In this case, Duplicator has a strategy to win the Slope Game immediately
after the first phase. This means he can enforce that the effects of the cycles of all observed
lassos are not behind (ρ, ρ′). By a straightforward induction using part 2 of Lemma 7 one can
show that Duplicator can preserve the invariant that all visited points are K-above (ρ, ρ′). This
in particular means that his counter value stays positive and he wins by enforcing an infinite
play.
Case d > 1. Let T denote the initial segment of Duplicator’s strategy in the Slope Game.
Every effect of a cycle in T is either not behind (ρ, ρ′) or behind (ρ, ρ′), but positive.
In the Simulation Game, Duplicator will play according to this initial segment T , using
rollbacks, as long as the effect of the rolled back cycle is not behind (ρ, ρ′). Just as in the
previous case, we can apply part 2 of Lemma 7 for c = K · d and derive that in this way,
Duplicator is able to keep the current counter values (K · d)-above (ρ, ρ′).
Suppose that after a few iterations, the effect (α, α′) of the last cycle is behind (ρ, ρ′) and
let (q¯n¯, q¯′n¯′) be the position in the Simulation Game directly afterwards. In this case, (α, α′) is
clearly positive and less steep than (ρ, ρ′). Now the point described by the counter values before
this last cycle was (K · d)-above (ρ, ρ′) and because the cycle is no longer than K, we know that
the point (n¯, n¯′) of current counter values (after the cycle) is still (K · (d−1))-above (ρ, ρ′). This
means, as (α, α′) ≺ (ρ, ρ′), that (n¯, n¯′) is also (K · (d− 1))-above (α, α′).
Knowing that Duplicator has a winning strategy in the Slope Game from ((q¯, q¯′), (α, α′)) of
segment depth at most d − 1, by induction assumption we obtain a winning strategy for Du-
plicator in the Simulation Game from (q¯n¯, q¯′n¯′). This completes the description of Duplicator’s
winning strategy from (qn, q′n′) and hence also the proof of Lemma 12.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 18
For technical convenience we assume w.l.o.g. that no belt contains the upper right corner of L0
(this can always be achieved by minimally extending L0, if necessary.) Thus every belt intersects
either the horizontal, or the vertical border of L0, but not both.
Recall that the non-parallel belts do not overlap/interfere with each other outside L0,
hence we can consider them separately. For the rest of the proof fix states q, q′ and let
(ρ, ρ′) = slope(q, q′). W.l.o.g. suppose that belt(q, q′) intersects the horizontal border of
L0 (if it intersects the vertical border of L0 the proof is analogous).
For simplicity we assume that no other belt is parallel to belt(q, q′). The proof below may
be easily adapted to the general case by considering a bunch of parallel belts jointly, instead of
just the single one belt(q, q′).
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By a cross-section at level n′ we mean the intersection of4q,q′ with two consecutive horizontal
lines at that level, i.e. with {(n, n′), (n, n′ + 1) : n ∈ N}. We may assume that cross-sections
are always non-empty (this can always be ensured by slightly widening belt(q, q′) if necessary).
We say that two cross-sections s1 and s2 are equal if one of them is obtained by a shift of the
other by a multiple of (ρ, ρ′); formally, we require for some k ∈ N,
s1 + k · (ρ, ρ′) = s2. (16)
Choose two cross-sections s1, s2 at levels n′1 and n′2 respectively, and k > 0 that satisfies (16).
Let P be the restriction of 4q,q′ to the area between s1 and s2, and A be the restriction of 4q,q′
to the area below s1:
A = {(n, n′) ∈ 4q,q′ : n′ < n′1} P = {(n, n′) ∈ 4q,q′ : n′1 ≤ n′ < n′2}.
Recall that A and P , similarly as 4q,q′ , are subsets of belt(q, q′). We claim:
Lemma 21. For every s1, s2 and k > 0 satisfying (16),
4q,q′ = A ∪ P ∗, where P ∗ =
⋃
i∈N
(P + i · k · (ρ, ρ′)).
Before proving this lemma note that it implies Lemma 18. Indeed, by Theorem 5, a cross-
section contains polynomially many points, and therefore there are at most exponentially many
non-equal cross sections. Thus, by the pigeonhole principle, there are surely two equal cross-
sections at exponentially bounded levels n′1 and n′2.
Now we prove Lemma 21. The proof strongly relies on the locality of the simulation condition.
We first claim one inclusion of Lemma 21, namely:
Claim 2. A ∪ P ∗ ⊆ 4q,q′ .
Proof. We show that the following relation is a simulation:
R = 4 \ {(qn, q′n′) : (n, n′) ∈ belt(q, q′)} ∪ {(qn, q′n′) : (n, n′) ∈ A ∪ P ∗}.
(Roughly speaking, R is obtained from 4 by replacing 4q,q′ with A ∪ P ∗.) We claim that R is
a simulation, relying on the locality of the simulation condition. Formally, we define the relative
R-neighborhood of a point (n, n′) as
{(pl, p′l′) : (p(n+ l), p′(n′ + l′)) ∈ R, (p, p′) ∈ Q×Q′, l, l′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}}.
Note that the simulation condition for a pair of configurations (qn, q′n′) with respect to the
relation R only depends on the relative R-neighborhood of (n, n′). Similarly, one defines the
relative 4-neighborhood of a point (n, n′).
By the definition of cross-section and of the sets A and P , the relative R-neighborhood
of a point (n, n′) ∈ R equals the relative 4-neighborhood of some (possibly other) point in
4q,q′ . Thus we deduce that every pair in R satisfies the simulation condition wrt. R, i.e. R is a
simulation. As 4 is the largest simulation, the claim follows.
In order to show the other inclusion of Lemma 21, extend n′1 and n′2 to an infinite arithmetic
progression
n′1, n
′
2, n
′
3, . . . ,
i.e. ni+1 = n′i+k·ρ′ for i ≥ 1, and consider the “segments” Pi of 4q,q′ defined by the corresponding
cross-sections:
Pi = {(n, n′) ∈ 4q,q′ : n′i ≤ n′ < n′i+1} for i ≥ 1.
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Clearly, P = P1 and 4q,q′ = A ∪
⋃
i≥1 Pi. By Claim 2 it follows that P1 + k · (ρ, ρ′) ⊆ P2, or
equivalently P1 ⊆ P2 − k · (ρ, ρ′). Analogously one shows:
Pi ⊆ Pi+1 − k · (ρ, ρ′) for every i ≥ 1. (17)
We claim that the inclusions are actually equalities:
Claim 3. Pi = Pi+1 − k · (ρ, ρ′), for every i ≥ 1.
Proof. Due to Equation (17), it suffices to show the inclusions Pi+1 − k · (ρ, ρ′) ⊆ Pi. The
inclusions follow, similarly as in the proof of Claim 2, from the observation that the following
relation is a simulation:
R = 4 \ {(qn, q′n′) : (n, n′) ∈ belt(q, q′)} ∪ {(qn, q′n′) : (n, n′) ∈ A ∪
⋃
i≥2
Pi− k · (ρ, ρ′)}.
The relation R is obtained from 4, roughly speaking, by removing the first segment P1 and
shifting all other segments Pi by vector −k · (ρ, ρ′). To prove that R is a simulation, we exploit
locality of the simulation condition exactly as before. Additionally, we use the observation
that the simulation condition is monotonic with respect to inclusion of relative neighborhoods,
together with the inclusions (17).
Claim 3 immediately implies Lemma 21 and thus Lemma 18.
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B Weak Simulation Checking
We show that the bounds on the coefficients of the Belt Theorem, as derived in Section 4, imply
that the construction from [4] for checking weak simulation uses only polynomial space.
In order to avoid repeating the involved construction from [4], we refer the reader to the
original paper for technical details and recover here only those notions and properties which
suffice to provide some intuition and derive the claimed PSPACE bound.
We aim to compute a description of 2 , the largest weak simulation over a given pair of OCN.
First we reduce this weak simulation game to a strong simulation game between two modified
systems.
Definition 22 (ω-Nets). An ω-net M = (Q,A, δ) is given by a finite set of control-states Q,
a finite set of actions A and transitions δ ⊆ Q × A × {−1, 0, 1, ω} ×Q. It induces a transition
system over the stateset Q × N that allows a step pm a−→p′m′ if either (p, a, d, p′) ∈ δ and
m′ = m+ d ∈ N or if (p, a, ω, p′) ∈ δ and m′ > m.
Lemma 23 ([4]). For two OCN N and N ′ with sets of control-states Q and Q′ resp., one can
construct a OCNM with states QM ⊇ Q and an ω-netM′ with states QM′ ⊇ Q′, such that for
each pair (q, q′) ∈ Q×Q′ of original control states,
qn 2 q′n′ w.r.t. N ,N ′ iff qn 4 q′n′ w.r.t. M,M′. (18)
Moreover, the sizes ofM andM′ are polynomial in the size of N and N ′.
Thus, it suffices to compute a description of the strong simulation relation relative to a given
OCN M = (Q,A, δ) and an ω-net M′ = (Q′, A, δ′). To do that, we construct a sequence of
successively decreasing (w.r.t. set inclusion) approximant relations 4i and show that 1) for all
i ∈ N, 4i is effectively semilinear and 2) there is some k ∈ N with 4k =4k+1 =4 , i.e., the
sequence converges to simulation preorder at some finite level k.
Intuitively, 4i is given by a parameterized simulation game that keeps track of how often
Duplicator uses ω-labelled transitions and in which Duplicator immediately wins if he plays such
a step the ith time. It is easy to see that this game favours Duplicator due to the additional
winning condition. With growing index i, this advantage becomes less important and the game
increasingly resembles a standard simulation game. Hence, ∀i ∈ N, 4i⊇4i+1 .
In [4], it is shown that these approximants 4i can in fact be characterized by equivalent (in
the sense of Lemma 24 below) ordinary strong simulation relations between suitably extended
OCN.
Lemma 24. There is a sequence (Si,S ′i) of pairs of OCN such that for all indices i ∈ N:
1. Si and S ′i contain all states ofM andM′ respectively.
2. For all configurations qn ∈ (Q × N) and q′n′ ∈ (Q′ × N) of M and M′ it holds that
qn 4i q′n′ w.r.t.M,M′ iff qn 4 q′n′ w.r.t. Si, S′i.
3. Si+1 and S ′i+1 can be computed from Si and S ′i alone.
The above conditions ensure decidability of weak simulation as they allow to iteratively com-
pute the approximants and detect convergence, by the effective semilinearity of strong simulation
over OCN [5].
To obtain an upper bound for the complexity of this procedure, we will bound the sizes of
all (Si, S′i) polynomially in the sizes ofM andM′. To do that, we recall some more properties
of the construction, starting by describing how the nets Si and S ′i look like.
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The nets Si and S ′i These nets are constructed using the notion of minimal sufficient values:
Definition 25. Consider the approximant 4i for some parameter i, which is characterised by
nets Si,S ′i (cf. point 2 of Lemma 24 above) and let (q, q′) ∈ (Q × Q′) be a pair of states. By
monotonicity, there is a minimal value suf (q, q′, i) ∈ N ∪ {ω} satisfying
∀n′ ∈ N. q(suf (q, q′, i)) 64i q′n′. (19)
Let suf (q, q′, i) be ω if no finite value satisfies this condition.
The idea behind the construction of nets for parameter i + 1 is as follows. A Simulation
Game played on the arena Si+1,S ′i+1 mimics the (i+ 1)-parameterized simulation game played
onM,M′ until Duplicator uses an ω-labelled transition, leading to some game position qn vs.
q′n′. Afterwards, the parameterized game would continue with the next lower parameter i.
By induction assumption, we can compute a representation of 4i and hence suf (q, q′, i) for
every pair (q, q′). Given these values, the nets Si+1 and S ′i+1 are constructed so that instead of
making steps that are due to ω-labelled transitions, Duplicator can enforce the play to continue in
some subgame that he wins iff Spoiler’s counter is smaller than the hard-wired value suf (q, q′, i).
This “forcing” of the play can be implemented for OCN simulation using a standard technique
called defender’s forcing (see e.g. [8]). So, the nets Si and S ′i consist of the original netsM,M′
where all ω-transitions in Duplicator’s netM′ are replaced by a small constant defenders-forcing
script, leading to the corresponding testing gadgets that test if Spoiler’s counter is at least as
large as the pre-computed sufficient value and let Spoiler win only if that is the case.
The actual test-gadgets are not very complicated: On Duplicator’s side, all gadgets are the
same simple loop over a newly introduced symbol, say e. Hence, S ′i = S ′1 for every i and this
new net is polynomial in the size ofM′ andM.
In Spoiler’s net Si, the gadgets G(q, q′, i) for states (q, q′) and index i solely depend on the
value suf (q, q′, i): If suf (q, q′, i) is finite, it suffices to have a counter-decreasing chain of e-steps
of length suf (q, q′, i), leading to some state which enables an action that cannot be replied to
by Duplicator. Otherwise, if suf (q, q′, i) = ω (no counter finite value satisfies Equation 19),
Spoiler should always lose, so a simple e-labelled loop can be used as gadget. To conclude,
each Si essentially consists of M plus chains G(q, q′, i), one for every pair of states (q, q′). We
summarize the crucial properties of this construction below.
Lemma 26.
1. suf (q, q′, 1) = ω for every pair (q, q′) ∈ Q×Q′.
2. suf (q, q′, i) ≥ suf (q, q′, i+ 1).
3. (Si,S ′i) contains precisely |Q×Q′| many gadgets, each.
4. If suf (q, q′, i) ∈ N then the size of gadget G(q, q′, i) is suf (q, q′, i) + 2.
5. No chain G(q, q′, i) contains transitions leading back toM.
Using properties 2 and 3 we derive that indeed (Sk,S ′k) = (Sk+1,S ′k+1), and hence 4k =
4k+1 =4 for some finite k ∈ N.
Our goal is to bound the sizes of the nets Si,S ′i polynomially in the sizes of M,M′ and
to show that they can indeed be constructed in polynomial space. From point 1 and the fact
whenever suf (q, q′, i) = ω, the gadget G(q, q′, i) is a trivial loop, we already know that the sizes
of S1 and S ′1 are polynomial inM,M′. Due to the particular shape of the nets (Si+1,S ′i+1), it
suffices to bound the values suf (q, q′, i).
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Bounding suf (q, q′, i) Observe that suf (q, q′, i) is defined in terms of the approximant 4i ,
which is characterized as the strong simulation 4 relative to the nets Si,S ′i by Lemma 24, Point
2. In fact, if we consider the colouring of 4 w.r.t. Si,S ′i, the value suf (q, q′, i) is the width of
the belt for (q, q′) if this belt is vertical and ω otherwise. Therefore, the value c in the Belt
Theorem applied to this colouring bounds all finite suf (q, q′, i).
We show how to bound c using the sharper estimation as formulated in Section 4.3 in terms
scc, the maximal size of any strongly connected component and acyc, the length of the longest
acyclic path in the product Si × S ′i:
c ≤ poly(scc) + acyc. (20)
This allows us to bound all values suf (q, q′, i) and hence the size of the nets for index i+ 1.
First, observe that the shape of all Si,S ′i (particularly Point 5 of Lemma 26, and the fact
that ∀i∈NS′i = S′1) implies that the strongly connected components are unchanged from index
i = 1 onward. Thus, scc is in fact polynomial in M,M′. Secondly, any path in the product
Si × S ′i can be split into two (possibly empty) parts: the part that remains in M×M′ and
a suffix that moves into at most one gadget G(q, q′, i). Since the maximal length of paths in
G(q, q′, i) is bounded by suf (q, q′, i), we can bound acyc as follows.
acyc ≤ |M×M′|+ max{suf (q , q ′, i) ∈ N | (q , q ′) ∈ Q ×Q ′}. (21)
Let Wi denote the maximal width of all vertical belts at level i, i.e., the largest finite value
suf (q, q′, i) over all (q, q′). By the argument above, we get for all indices i ∈ N,
Wi+1 ≤ poly(M,M′) + Wi . (22)
Now, from properties 2 and 4 of Lemma 26 we can deduce that there are no more than K =
|Q × Q′| indices i such that Wi+1 ≥ Wi. This is because the size of the value suf (q, q′, i) for a
particular pair (q, q′) can only increase once, going from index i to i + 1 if suf (q, q′, i) = ω >
suf (q, q′, i+ 1). Therefore, we can bound Wi, and thus values suf (q, q′, i), for all indices i ∈ N
by
Wi ≤ K · (poly(|M×M′|) + 1). (23)
We conclude that the sizes of all Si,S ′i are polynomial in the sizes of N and N ′. It remains to
show that we can compute these values in polynomial space, because this allows us to effectively
construct the nets for the next parameter i+ 1.
Computing suf (q, q′, i) We analyse the colouring of the simulation 4 relative to the one-
counter nets Si and S ′i. In particular we need to answer the following questions, for each given
pair of states (q, q′) ∈ Q×Q′,
1. Is the belt for (q, q′) vertical? And if yes,
2. What is its exact width?
By Theorem 5, we can bound all ratios (ρ, ρ′), which are the slopes of belts polynomially. Let
(ρ, ρ′) be the ratio of the steepest belt with ρ′ > 0. Recall that c bounds the width of all vertical
belts. To answer the first question, it suffices to check the colour of some point (n, n′) that is
both c-above (ρ, ρ′) and c-below of (0, 1), i.e., n > c. For instance, n = c+1 and n′ = 2(c+1)( ρρ′ )
is surely such a point.
If the belt for (q, q′) is vertical, then by Theorem 5, Point 2, we have qn, 64 q′n′. Otherwise,
if the belt is not vertical, then by point 1 of Theorem 5, we must have qn, 4 q′n′.
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To answer the second question, we consider the periodicity description of the colouring (cf.
Section 5). Although this description is of exponential size and we thus cannot fully keep it
in memory, we can, in polynomial space, compute point queries. Moreover, we know that the
colouring in any belt is described by some non-trivial initial colouring and is repetitive from
some exponentially bounded level onwards. Thus, if we consider the vertical belt for states
(q, q′), from some level n′0, the colouring stabilizes so that for all n′ ≥ n′0, we have qn 4 q′n′ iff
n < suf (q, q′, i).
We can now iteratively check the colour of the point (n, n′0) for decreasing values n = c to 0
and some fixed, but sufficiently high n′0. By Theorem 2, this can surely be done in polynomial
space. suf (q, q′, i) must be the largest considered n < c where qn 64 q′n′0 still holds.
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